This essay is taken from Chapter 6 of Helen Alford O.P. and Michael Naughton, Managing as if Faith Mattered: Christian Social Principles within the Modern Organization (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001) pp 152-176. The chapter examines the question of ownership embedded within a Christian ethic of property.

 

6

 

Corporate Ownership:

Temperance and Common Use in Finance[1]

 

Michael Naughton

(mjnaughton@stthomas.edu)

 

Helen Alford O.P.

 Alford@pust.urbe.it

 

 

The paramount problem is not how to stop the growth of property, and the building up of wealth; but how to manage it so that every species of property, like a healthful fruit tree, will spread its roots deeply and widely in the soil of a popular proprietorship.  The paramount problem is not how to crush, or hawk at, or hamper the corporation, merely because it is a corporation; but how to make this new form of property ownership a workable agent toward repeopleizing the proprietorship of the country’s industries. [2]

                                                                                                                                 Peter S. Grosscup

                                                                                             Judge of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals

 

 

 W

ritten in 1905, Judge Grosscup’s comments capture both the free-market system’s strength--its ability to create wealth--and its weakness--its inability to distribute wealth equitably.  The ownership of the corporation, according to Grosscup, lies at the heart of the distribution problem in free market economies.  Since the corporation is the main generator of wealth in a free-market economy, those who own corporations will share more fully in the distribution of that wealth.  For Grosscup, a principal issue for corporations is how to structure ownership so as to distribute more effectively the wealth of society, without sacrificing the corporation’s  wealth-generating ability.

            The problem of wealth disparity that inspired Grosscup’s comments at the beginning of the twentieth century burdens us in a particular way as we enter the twenty-first century.  This is particularly true on a global basis. The United Nations Development Program, for example, concluded in 1996 that 100 countries found themselves worse off than they had been 15 years earlier.  It is estimated that the combined wealth of the 224 richest individuals in the world equals the combined annual incomes of the poorest 47% of the world population, that is, of some 2.5 billion people.[3]  A variety of evidence indicates that even in the U.S., where there has been significant economic growth over the last two decades, the gap between the most affluent Americans and everyone else in the nation is the widest it has been since the end of World War II.[4] Although the average income for households increased 10% between 1979 and 1994, 97% of that growth was claimed by the top 20% of households. This has resulted into widened economic disparity where the net worth of the top 1% is now greater than that of the bottom 90%.[5] And while mutual funds and 401(k) plans have fueled much-celebrated gains in capital participation, one recent study nevertheless showed that 71% of U.S. households hold no stock or hold stock valued at less than $2,000.[6]  

            For the reader who may find these numbers too abstract, Jeff Gates cites the rise of  “Tiffany/K-Mart” marketing strategies.  K-Mart and Tiffany, which represent the low- and high-end retail markets, reported increased earnings in 1997, while midscale chains such as J.C. Penney suffered significant losses.  National retailers are setting up two-tiered, high-low marketing systems, as advertising and investment houses warn of the erosion of traditional, “middle-class” mass-markets.  Retailers “on the ground” see that a shift in income-patterns is polarizing markets to the disadvantage of operations aimed at a shrinking class of middle incomes.[7]

            For some, wealth disparity simply represents a “natural force” we must accept in a free market economy. Paine Webber Inc., for example, simply readjusts its investment flows by advising investors to “‘avoid companies that cater to the ‘middle’ of the consumer market.’”[8]  Others, however, see wealth disparity more in terms of choice than market determination.  William McDonough, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,  insists:

Issues of equity and social cohesion [are] issues that affect the very temperament of the country.  We are forced to face the question of whether we will be able to go forward together as a unified society with a confident outlook or as a society of diverse economic groups suspicious of both the future and each other.[9]

 

For McDonough, unless we take seriously the common good as it relates to wealth distribution, we may find our cultural and political arenas too fragmented to support a healthy free market system.

            Many complex causes account for widening income disparity.  One key cause, particularly in the U.S., has been the interplay among productivity gains, wages and capital.  Since 1974, productivity in manufacturing increased by 68% and the service sector increased by 50%. During this same time period, employee wages stagnated.  The rewards of productivity consequently went to capital. With the richest 25% owning 82% of corporate stock in the US, the clear winners were capital owners, and the consequence was increased income disparity.[10]

 

 

Pockets of Prosperity, Holes of Disparity:

Some Numbers to Ponder[11]

 

·                    The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) reported in 1999 that the world’s 200 richest people have more than doubled their net worth in the four years to 1998, to more than $1 trillion.   That’s equal to the combined annual income of the poorest 47 percent of the world’s people (2.5 billion).  

·                    The wealth of the top three billionaires now exceeds the combined GDP of all the least developed countries and their 600 million people.  The assets of the 84 richest individuals exceed the GDP of China with its 1.2 billion people.

·                    UNDP reported in 1999 that 80 countries have per capita incomes lower than they were a decade ago.   Sixty countries have been growing steadily poorer since 1980.

·                    In 1960, the income gap between the fifth of the world’s people living in the richest countries and the fifth in the poorest was 30 to 1.  By 1990, the gap had widened to 60 to 1.  By 1997, it had grown to 74 to 1.

·                    Over the past three decades, the poorest 20 percent of the world’s people saw their share of global income decline from 2.3 percent to 1.3 percent.

·                     In 1996, the Census Bureau reported record levels of inequality, with the top fifth of U.S. households claiming 48.2 percent of national income while the bottom fifth gets by on 3.6 percent.  

·                    The United States leads all OECD nations in the disparity in both wealth and income.  

 

 

 

            The problem, as Grosscup suggests, is not the magnitude of capital owners’ gains, but the system’s tendency to restrict rather than to promote participation in capital ownership. When the power of the ownership of productive capital is highly concentrated in the hands of the few, the non-owning majority’s incomes grow uncertain; when capital is disconnected from labor, its uses are determined without regard for their impact on labor or on society at large.[12]

            As Peter Drucker put it, “a change in property ownership always results in a change in power. We’ve had a change in property with the emergence of institutional investors. That is a change in power.”[13]  Power in this case has gone to depersonalized capital markets, which have no concern for employees or particular communities beyond their ability to increase wealth. The markets’ relentless pressure for maximum investor returns leads corporations to “unleash what the Wall Street Journal characterizes as the ‘four horsemen of the workplace’: (1) downsizing; (2) moving operations to low-wage countries, (3) increased automation and (4) the use of temporary workers.”[14]  Most people—certainly most wage-earners—might concede that firms can use one or more of these expedients legitimately to meet economic crises, but few would describe their combination as legitimate, ordinary business practice.   Nevertheless, they have become staples of “disconnected” capital’s search for ever-increasing returns, regardless of the social effects.

            In order for people to participate most effectively in the market system’s distribution of wealth, they need access to two main sources of income: labor and capital.  Restricting their income effectively to one source--labor--through the concentration of ownership, increases the probability that their access to goods will fall short of their needs.  This effect is intensified in an economy such as our own, where capital income increases faster than labor income.  For many people, wages--even the wages of two earners--are alone no longer adequate to secure a just share of wealth over the long-term.  When John A. Ryan wrote in 1935 that an employee’s rise to ownership “relieves him from complete dependence upon his wages,”[15] he already understood  “relief” to mean relief from bearing an inequitably large share of the market-economy’s risks and an inequitably small share of its rewards. 

            We need, then, a view of capital property that asks the fundamental questions: What is property for? Whom does it serve?  Within our diverse society, answers to these questions will differ significantly.  As we saw in Chapter 2, a prime source of these differences will be the respondents’ views of the purpose of the corporation.  Within the last thirty years in the U.S., two men have played critical roles in addressing these questions, bringing about two important financial trends: mergers and acquisitions on the one hand, and employee ownership on the other.  These two men place property and finance within two different philosophical paradigms, one individualistic and the other communitarian.  Understanding how they answer questions concerning the nature and purpose of corporate property provides a context in which to appreciate a Christian ethic of property and ownership as it bears on the modern corporation.

 

1. Two Conflicting Views of Property: Individualistic and Communitarian

            The first of our two figures is Jerome Kohlberg. The founder of Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts & Co. (KKR), and often considered the father of leveraged buyouts (LBOs),[16] Kohlberg’s main concern was the separation of corporate ownership and control.[17]  As corporations have grown larger, capital holdings have been dispersed among larger numbers of shareholders, reducing shareholders’ ability to control the company.   The largest shareholder at a company such as General Motors may own only 1% of the shares and, most likely, this owner will be a pension fund or some other institutional shareholder.  This dispersed ownership structure diffuses shareholders’ influence, preventing them from taking a decisive hand in maximizing the return on their capital.  Kohlberg’s solution to this problem is acquisition through the leveraged buyout.  By replacing diffuse public shareholders, who exercise little control over the corporation, with a small group of highly motivated investors who exercise considerable control over a small group of highly motivated executives, owners will be in a better position to maximize their wealth (this in part describes why executive bonuses are so high, since there is an alignment between stock price and executive salary).[18]

            In the terms of our discussion in Chapter 2 on the common good, Kohlberg understands property primarily as a private and particular good—a tendency shared by many of us in the western world.  For him, a corporation is an investment that should maximize the particular goods of individual shareholders on the basis of two dimensions: risk and return.  It has no inherent or “natural” common purpose of wealth creation for distribution, let alone of building community or promoting virtue.  Finance serves as a technique to maximize the particular wealth of individual shareholders, who in their private lives can determine what they want to do with it.  Thus, corporate property is reduced to a “financial asset owned for its return/risk characteristics and with a view to its eventual sale.”[19] Underlying Kohlberg’s understanding of corporate property is a philosophical individualism that implies at least two things: a) exclusivity of ownership, or in other words: “this property is mine and not yours”; b) control, that is, “since it’s mine, I alone determine what it is to be used for.”[20]

            Our focus now turns to another man, and to a very different response.  Often considered the father of employee ownership, Louis Kelso viewed property in communitarian terms.  Kelso maintained that Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) would serve as an effective corporate financial technique to distribute wealth in the economy.[21]  Based on his two factor theory (that income derives from one’s labor and/or one’s capital), Kelso wrote in the 1960s and 70s that, owing to increasing use of technology and to international competition, capital would play a greater role in wealth distribution than wages from labor.[22]

            Kelso saw the capital ownership of corporations as the main vehicle for wealth distribution, which for him is a necessary condition of human development (promotion of the common good).  Financing companies is a means to a social end, namely, to build enterprises capable of long-term growth so as to create conditions for a just distribution of wealth.  For Kelso, then, corporate property has an important social purpose: to make capital accessible to all, especially to those without the financial means to ensure access to credit.  An ESOP is one way to finance wider ownership, or in the words of Judge Grosscup, to “repeopleize” corporate property (in Europe cooperatives have been the main means to that end).[23]   As a financing device, an ESOP turns labor workers into capital workers, which in turn links the structures of ownership with social equity.  (The mechanics and problems of ESOPs are examined in greater detail in the last section of this chapter.)

 

 

Kohlberg

Kelso

Definition of

 Problem

Lack of Control

 by the Few

Lack of Participation

by the Many

End of Property

 

Individual Gain

Just Distribution

Means of Finance

 

Leverage (LBOs)

Leverage (ESOPs)

 

            Historically, the lives of Kelso and Kohlberg are entangled, making their different views of property all the more striking.  In the 1960s, Kelso supposedly introduced the technique of leveraging corporations to Kohlberg.  To leverage a company is to buy the company using borrowed money, with the company itself serving as collateral.  Kelso envisioned leveraged financing through an ESOP as an effective means for employees to participate in the ownership of a company, thereby creating the conditions for a more just distribution of wealth.  Since employees would never be able to save enough money to buy shares, they would have to borrow.  Kohlberg adapted Kelso’s technique of leveraged financing, but applied it to a different end, based on his different view of property.  Indifferent to wealth distribution and income disparity, Kohlberg leveraged companies so that outside investors or executive management (that is, his clients) could buy the company and exercise control for the sake of maximizing shareholder wealth.

            Kelso and Kohlberg used the same technique of leveraged financing for two radically different ends based on two different philosophical traditions of property.  As we mentioned in Chapter 3, techniques, such as financial leveraging, become an opportunity for virtue only when they are ordered toward the common good. For Kelso, the technique of leveraged financing can be a powerful means for expanding ownership in the interest of a just distribution of wealth.  For Kohlberg, however, this technique serves the particular, private good of shareholders and nothing more.

            Kohlberg’s use of leveraging infuriated Kelso: “I taught them [Kohlberg and others] the art of the leveraged buyout.  Now they’re just using it for the wrong purposes, to make themselves and a few people richer.”[24]  Kelso saw leveraged financing in the service of concentrating wealth as an abuse.  His case is not unlike that of the researchers who developed the drug methotrexate to fight cancer and save lives, only to see other researchers adapt it to take lives as one of the main ingredients in abortifacients.  Techniques can be used for good or ill.  For Kelso, to make the technique of leveraged financing into the means for private gain only is a perversion, since “instead of making economic power more democratic, they [Kohlberg and others] make it more plutocratic.”[25]  In other words, Kelso’s difficulty with Kohlberg’s use of leverage is that it finances capital for an existing “elite” of owners only. It does nothing to extend the ranks of capital ownership.

            This conflict between Kohlberg and Kelso represents a conflict over answers to the questions, What is property for? Whom does it serve?  Kohlberg represents an individualistic understanding of property that denies an authentic social and spiritual purpose to the corporation. Kelso, however, represents a communitarian vision of corporate property that fits well in the Christian social tradition.  We begin to see in two men the concrete and practical implications of philosophical beliefs concerning property.  It is important now for us to go deeper into the roots of the communitarian understanding of property underlying Kelso’s goals, as it appears in the Christian tradition.  By retrieving this tradition about property, and on employee ownership in particular, we can provide a solid basis for reexamining the ownership and distribution of productive capital.  It is precisely here that an investigation informed by the Christian social tradition can help to answer why a just distribution of income in terms of capital and labor has a great claim on all people.

 

 2. A Christian Property Ethic As It Relates To the Ownership of the Corporation

      It is important to recognize that the idea of ownership is one of the signature-ideas of Western civilization. Most major philosophers and theologians have written about property, and all economists and business people are dependent in one way or another on these philosophical principles.  At root, the way we organize property is a way of organizing social relations, and so has a powerful influence over the goodness—or otherwise—of people’s lives. We can characterize an understanding of property on four levels.

            The Christian understanding of property is, first, theological. It arises out of our belief in a God who created the world “and saw it was very good,” and who, as part of that creation, gave humankind the gift of dominion over the earth. In other words, the basic, core idea that grounds the Christian understanding of property is the reality of gift, that it is a gift from God.

            While we are familiar with the experience of gifts, we tend to see them as private and individual exchanges. This understanding of gift, however, is not universal. When Native Americans encountered Europeans in the gift encounter, they were baffled by their possessiveness over gifts given them. Native Americans expected their white visitors to give back their gifts so as to keep them moving. This idea of setting gifts in motion equally baffled westerners negatively characterizing Native Americans as “Indian givers.”[26] Yet, what Native Americans understood, and what we should take heed of, is that when a gift is not shared, it corrupts the holder.  The one who makes the gift an occasion for selfish hoarding, who fails to put the gift in motion, becomes corrupted by the gift itself.

        In Western culture, we tend, like Kohlberg, to see property as a so-called private matter:  “So long as it doesn’t hurt anyone, I have the right to do whatever I like with what is mine.”  Yet, our “private” interpretation of property, however, should give us pause for thought.  St. Augustine pointed out that the word private comes from “privation,” a certain loss of meaning or substance.[27]  To understand property only in private terms is to refuse to recognize its inherent “giftedness.”

            Since we do not create anything, but rather inherit everything from God and others, human ownership does not consist in absolute dominion over property (absolute dominion belongs to God alone), but in a limited and responsible dominion which should be characterized as stewardship.  A merely private understanding of property, then, asserts a dominion human beings neither do, nor can, exercise.

            If we are to understand property, we must face the universal experience of property, namely, in the end, everything is given back.  The story is told of a rich man’s wake. When someone asked, “How much did he leave?” the simple, conversation-stopping answer came back:  “Everything!”[28]  Property--all wealth--is a gift of which ownership makes us no more than temporary stewards.  We neither arrive in this life with property nor leave with it, and as owners we will be called to a steward’s account for our use of property. 

 


A Christian Property Ethic

            Christian managers and entrepreneurs, if they manage as if faith matters, need to be convinced that their property and their work are not ultimately theirs and that they will be accountable not just to stockholders, but to Him “who knows how to ask questions.” [29] They need to keep in mind that they will be judged, with mercy but also with justice, to seek out whether they have been stewards or exploiters of the property and wealth committed to them.

             If to possess property is ultimately to have received a gift, then ownership inherently involves our taking on board the second level of the Christian property ethic, summarized in the principle of “the universal destination of goods.” This follows since possession is for the sake of use, and the gift of created goods is made to all human beings alike, not only to the brightest or the richest, nor yet to one country rather than another, nor to one generation rather than another.  Inscribed within the very make-up of property, of useful goods, is a “universal destination”: their goodness is for all alike, so that all people can benefit from God’s creation.  To put the matter in the terms we developed in Chapter 2, the fruits of creation must be made available to all human beings at the level of use.   St. Ambrose, with the directness and confidence that marks the Fathers of the Church, declares, “The earth belongs to all, not to the rich.”[30]

            Embedded in God’s gift of creation is, then, the right of all people to the common use of created goods.  To subdue the earth is to command its fruits not only for oneself, but also for others, through increasingly comprehensive spheres of community: for one’s family and for one’s friends; for one’s co-workers, and for one’s fellow-citizens and colleagues in the political enterprise; for one’s fellow-members of the body of Christ, and for one’s neighbor—that is, for anyone in human need. The duty to subdue the earth, then, cannot be realized unless all people can share in the means of dominion (raw material, technology, education, credit, etc.), so as to gain a decent standard of living.[31]  Consequently, any idea of an absolute right to the possession or use of property is alien to Christian social thought, since property is neither the creature of its owner nor destined unqualifiedly for its owner’s use.[32]

      The third level of a Christian ethic of ownership and property asks what conditions foster greater common use of God’s creation. We argued in the first several pages of this chapter that a wider distribution of productive property or capital is a necessary component of greater common use.[33]  Property and capital, in order to serve labor, must be reconnected to labor through ownership. This is why within the Christian tradition, and as the subject of special attention in Catholic social teaching, it is strongly emphasized that employees should participate in the ownership of business organizations.  As John Paul II has stated, while various employee ownership plans may or may not be applicable in specific situations, “it is clear that recognition of the proper position of labor and the worker in the production process demands various adaptations in the sphere of the right to ownership of the means of production.”[34]

            Jeff Gates points out that the more connected (through ownership) capital can be to labor and to the communities which supply labor, the more it can serve the common good (he and others propose not only ESOPs but also CSOPs—Customer Stock Ownership Plans, RESOPs—Related Enterprise Share Ownership Plans, and other stock ownership plans to reconnect capital to the communities that generate it).  Gates aims at an “up-close capitalism” in which those who stand to be affected by the uses of corporate property consider those uses from the perspective of owners, and speak for or against them with the voices of owners.

            Thomas Aquinas made a similar point over 700 years ago.  He explained that private possession can serve the principle of common use because it creates three important conditions within society at large and within particular organizations: personal initiative, productivity, and peace. [35]   These three criteria do not guarantee the common use of property.  They do create conditions tending to ease the individual’s access to the goods of creation by overcoming the disparity in wealth we described at the beginning of this chapter.  Examining these three conditions in light of employee ownership can help us to see how a Christian ethic of property ownership can function.

            A) Personal Initiative and Motivation: When people own something, they are more likely to use it in a considered, enterprising way.  The person is more likely to dedicate time and talent to caring for and developing his own property than to caring for another’s, and is more likely to show consideration for properties that are owned by some agency than for those which are not known to be anyone’s special concern.  For example, one shows more initiative for the care of one’s house than for one’s rented apartment, and people generally treat city parks with more consideration than vacant lots.             For the individual employee, worker ownership can serve as a means to a greater sense of self-direction at work, since when people “know they are working on what belongs to them, they work with far greater eagerness and diligence.”[36]  Many employees are not concerned solely with the foundational, financial goods they receive from their labor.  They also want to know that they are working for themselves, and that their work is a matter of personal achievement and even an occasion of excellence.  Employees who do not participate in the ownership of the company find it more difficult (although not impossible) to make a personal connection with what is not their own.  Worker ownership can serve as an aid to employees’ development by fostering responsibility and accountability.[37]

            B) Long-term Productivity and Efficiency: This personal initiative tends toward greater productivity and efficiency, and less waste.  CEO of Springfield Remanufacturing Company (SRC), Jack Stack, brings this point out in favor of his company’s ESOP.  In his view, employee owners tend to reorient themselves to the whole question of what it means to benefit from the company.  They think of “sacrificing instant gratification” for long term stability and longevity.  Stack explains:

[If] you have equity and understand it, you know why it’s important to build for the future.  You can make long-term decisions.  You will pay attention to the day-to-day details, but you’re doing it for the right reason: because it’s the best way to achieve lasting success.[38]

 

            C) Social Peace: When people possess, as their own, the things they need to meet their responsibilities, keep their promises and realize their ambitions, they are simply more at peace and more disposed to harmony with others than they are in the opposite case.  This homely fact has become very evident in the downsizing of corporations.  Employees may have large pensions at stake in the aggregate, but--because they are not owners--lack any control over the disposition of their company.  In such cases, employees’ anxiety and hostility are likely to run in direct proportion to the size of their stake in outcomes over which they have no say.  The more people who participate in the ownership of property, particularly productive property, the better the chances that wealth will flow, like blood through the human body, as a force for social cohesion.[39]

            When employees are not enabled, or fail, to participate in the ownership of their own organization, a divergence of economic interests is created, making peace more difficult.  When shareholders and management seek higher profits, lower labor costs and greater efficiency, while employees seek higher fixed wages and stringent work rules, the ownership structure fosters distrust between employees and management. This weakens a company’s competitiveness in the marketplace and inhibits mutual cooperation for the good of the whole organization.[40]  A house divided against itself, as the Scriptures note, cannot long stand—let alone prosper.[41]  Isolating the means of production “as a separate property in order to set it up in the form of ‘capital’ in opposition to ‘labor’” makes the possibility of peace ever more difficult.[42]   Stack explains, “[Y]ou have to knock down the barriers that separate people, that keep people from coming together as a team.”[43]  At SRC, he saw the lack of shared ownership between management and workers as a critical barrier to overcome. By aligning the perceived goods of employees and managers through stock ownership, SRC could act as a unit in the increasing confidence that people were working for each other.[44]

            Personal initiative, long-term productivity and peace are necessary conditions for making corporate property common in use.  They do not, however, complete a Christian property/ownership ethic.  The common use of property requires further that we not regard property as something to be distributed and used merely for our own particular ends.  We need to go to a fourth level that calls us to use our property for the building up of “a community of work,” established by participation in common ends and virtues.

            All property, as Aquinas explains, should be seen “as common so that, in fact, a person should readily share it when he sees others in need.”[45]  A more equitable distribution of particular goods by individual ownership is not enough: employees and management alike must understand and treat their shares in the ownership of the company as instruments of others’ good, and not merely of their own particular interests.  This necessary regard for others’ good is twofold: it involves participation in seeking the good of each and every member of the firm by promoting the firm’s success;  it involves ordering the activities of the firm so as to promote the good of the wider community and its members (among whom, of course, are the members of the firm).

            The fact that a company is widely owned by employees, or that its financial success is otherwise immediately distributed among its employees, does not in itself entail that the firm is in pursuit of the common good.  Nor is the enthusiasm of a company’s employees, or their dedication to its business plan, a sure mark that they form a genuine communion.  Pornography and tobacco companies can be employee-owned, and criminal enterprises often generate considerable élan.   By comparison to the overall good of the (political) community, the common good, the ends of even the largest business organization are private, as are the ends of individual persons.  Like private individuals, business organizations’ fundamental contribution to the common good is observance of the law.  And like private individuals, their more mature contribution involves becoming a participant in the promotion of the goods of the whole community (we will examine the social role of products and services in Chapter 7).

            Real ownership by employees of the organization offers, so to speak, an occasion of virtue. When an employee sees her contribution to the organization as the source of benefits not only for herself and her family, but for her co-workers, and when her contribution to the success of the firm is also of clear service to the community at large, she participates in a fuller way--through virtue--in her work.  In the words of Aquinas, “a man’s will is not right in willing a particular good [such as property], unless he refer it to the common as an end.”[46]  The equitable distribution of corporate property is welcome for its own sake, but much more for the sake of establishing a community of work through which the firm’s success promotes at once the employee’s individual good and the good of the whole community.  Employees are connected not only on the level of economic gain, but also on the level of organizational purpose that is social at its core.

            This discussion of property suggests the answer to a scriptural question that should particularly unsettle those of us in the rich West: Why is it hard for the rich man to enter the kingdom of God?  If we fail to order our own particular goods to a common life, our lack of intent to build community is not neutral; it is a positive refusal to take up a duty incumbent upon citizens of the kingdom of God. This theme is particularly strong in Luke’s Gospel.  Jesus tells the story of the rich man’s quandary over what to do with his surplus harvest.

What shall I do?” he asked himself. “I have no place to store my harvest. I know!” he said.  “I will pull down my grain bins and build larger ones.  All my grain and my goods will go there. Then I will say to myself: You have blessings in reserve for years to come. Relax! Eat heartily, drink well. Enjoy yourself.” But God said to him, “You fool!  This very night your life shall be required of you.  To whom will all this piled-up wealth of yours go?”  That is the way it works with the man who grows rich for himself instead of growing rich in the sight of God.[47]

 

            The parable is clear: the use of property must be directed to the good of others, if property is to serve as a means to the rich man’s development, especially to his ultimate development—salvation and happiness with God, the ultimate end of our human existence.  When property is not directed and used for the common good, property becomes a kind of evil, the occasion for regression from human virtue.  As the rich man’s failure to use his full granary for those in need has corrupted him, so our property, whether individual or corporate, can corrupt us if we fail to use it for others.

            This idea of property as it relates to common use and virtue may sound to some too idealistic, too communitarian, or too impractical.  Yet, we should ask: Why should this understanding strike us as a foreign intrusion into our usual way of looking at property?   Is it because we live in a culture that reduces all “goods” to commodities for particular, private consumption?  Or is it because we have privatized our faith to such an extent that we no long see its social and practical implications?  Whatever the reason, we should take care to reexamine how we view our property, since it affects how we see other dimensions of our life.

            To adhere to a strictly private, strictly individualistic view of property’s uses is like holding that personal pleasure is the only use of sex.  While abundant pleasure naturally accompanies healthy sexuality, the quest of sexual pleasure alone--sexual hedonism--has always been a token of personal futility, and a mortal affront alike to the human dignity of the hedonist and to the dignity of the objects of his desire.  So with wealth: while it “naturally” accompanies healthy enterprise, the quest of wealth alone is an affront to the human dignity of businesspeople, and a slur on the integrity of the broader community, which alone makes the ownership of property possible and meaningful.

            The habit of avoiding a “myopic” focus on one goal such as profits or wealth maximization is necessary for understanding the ownership of the modern corporation.[48]   We call this habit the virtue of temperance.  As we mentioned in Chapter 3, temperance is that virtue which curbs and restrains our desire for various objects such as wealth.  The amount of wealth to be gained or lost in market economies is of such enormous proportions that St. Paul’s warning for love of money as a root to all kinds of evil should not be far from our minds.[49]  The individualistic view of property has no resource to curb the “all-consuming desire for profit” borne in all of us.[50]  If the generation of money-denominated returns sums up for us the whole purpose of corporate property, then the recipe for intemperance, the excessive pursuit of wealth at the expense of other goods, is in the making.

            Kenneth Goodpaster describes this intemperance in terms of teleopathy.  Combining the Greek roots for end or purpose--telos--and for disease or sickness--pathos,  the term teleopathy he defines as an “over emphasis on limited purposes by individuals and corporations.”[51]  Wealth generation is a limited goal; it should not be an overarching purpose.  To use our earlier language, wealth generation is in the nature of a means, and cannot serve to guide us as an end of action.

            In business, as in any other profession, the practitioner is constantly tempted to value certain limited goals, such as wealth, over larger goals, such as human development.  In the case in point, teleopathy or intemperance is the bad habit of looking to wealth maximization “as supremely action-guiding.”  Wealth, or the possession of goods--like sex, power, fame, food, drink, and so forth--is corrupting principally in the direction of excess, and so needs an extrinsic limit; the limit of right possession is the need of one’s family, friends, coworkers, neighbors, fellow-citizens. Or to put it another way, the limit of one’s possessions is the opportunity to distribute them for the relief of the common need and the promotion of the common good. 

            Augustine states that “the temperate man finds confirmation of the rule forbidding him to love the things of this life, or to deem any of them desirable for its own sake.”[52]  Wealth generated from property is not to be maximized for its own sake; rather, the generation of wealth, if it is not to become a “pathology” or sickness, must be directed to the common good.  Temperance, as it refers to our property and wealth, helps us to overcome our fixations and addictions by resisting our intense desire for a narrow goal, such as profit maximization either for the company or the individual, in order to redirect us toward a much broader one, such as the common good.  By seeing this broader goal of the common good that we explored in Chapter 2, managers have a better chance of creating conditions within the organization whereby a real community can develop.  Yet, without temperance, companies become hazardously focused toward financial goals and cease to use capital as a tool for a broader social purpose.[53]

            Taking seriously the Christian understanding of property provides a deeper analysis of what is at stake in the corporation.  The following ESOP case illustrates in more practical ways some possible concrete implications of a Christian property ethic and the ownership of an organization.

 

3. Case: Phelps County Bank

            All kinds of US companies have ESOPs: large companies, such as United Airlines and Cargill; smaller and medium-sized companies, such as Wierton Steel and Springfield Remanufacturing Company.  To give an idea of how an ESOP works, and to illustrate its benefits and problems, we focus on the Phelps County Bank (PCB), an independent community bank in Rolla, Missouri with 60 employees.[54]

            PCB has a leveraged ESOP.[55]   The leveraged ESOP can be described through the following four stages:[56]

 

Stage 1: The board of directors and representatives of the current owners agree to sell part or all of the company to the employees.  They appoint the trustees of the ESOP who set up the ESOP trust.

 

Stage 2: A financial institution lends money to the ESOP trust, usually at a reduced rate because of U.S. tax advantages to banks.  The ESOP is subject to the same feasibility standards and corporate guarantees as direct loans to the corporation.  For example, the credit for the loan is secured by and repaid from the existing capital and future profits of the company.  The ESOP trust in turn buys the stock from existing owners and sets up a temporary stock account.

 

Stage 3: As the loan is paid back, shares are released from the temporary stock account and distributed to individual employee stock accounts.  Norman Kurland explains that “Shares of stock are allocated to the individual accounts of workers only as blocks of shares are ‘earned’, i.e., the company contributes cash out of future pretax profits to the trust.  The cash, which is treated as a tax-deductible employee benefit, is used to repay the stock acquisition loan.”

 

Stage 4: When employees retire, they usually sell their shares back to the ESOP, from which new employees can then purchase them.[57]

 

                When PCB’s management presented the ESOP to employees, they were not greeted with a standing ovation or a thank-you.  What they received was skepticism.   From the employees’ perspective, nothing noticeably changed in the organization, except that the ESOP would replace future wage increases with shares of stock.  Most of the PCB employees were raised in homes where incomes were earned through wages.[58]  Apart from this cultural dependency on wages, younger parents found the deferred income idea difficult to take. Faced with real economic pressures, and liable to “consumerism,” many employees--and particularly younger employees--“have a relatively strong preference of current over future consumption; they do not wish to save 25% of their compensation to secure future pension benefits.”[59]

            Yet, through its ESOP, PCB has created more wealth and has distributed that wealth more justly throughout the organization, over the long term.  In the first year of the ESOP (1980), a junior officer’s total contribution to the plan was $456.  In 1994, that same officer’s contribution to the plan was $29,300, with an accumulated account balance of more than $200,000.  An ESOP is like a house mortgage.  At the beginning, payments to the loan take very little off the principal, but as the house appreciates and as the interest is paid off, equity in the house increases at a faster rate.[60]

            A critical underlying problem in setting up the ESOP at PCB was resistance to the culture of ownership.  For the ESOP to take hold at PCB, education predicated on an ownership philosophy was imperative.  Ownership must exist not only on the books, but also in the culture: employees must take ownership over their own work; they must be equipped with knowledge and skills to be “real owners” of the firm.  PCB undertook an educational program soon after initiating its ESOP.  All employees became more familiar with PCB’s own products and with the firm’s financial status, and they developed a wider understanding of the banking industry in general.   The new training and education were very costly and time-consuming.  They required more meetings and new job duties, which added more hours to the day for most employees.

            Not everyone found ownership appealing.  Initiating employee ownership demanded additional time and energy from all employees, which, at PCB, caused problems in transitioning.  It took people out of their “comfort zone,” creating resentment.  Between 1986 and 1988, PCB experienced a turnover of approximately 40% in non-management  and  25%  in management staff.  As PCB’s new culture became more widely known, however, the firm began to attract employees who wanted to learn and grow with the ownership of the company.  Existing employees who remained with PCB found the transition from a conventional to an employee-owned corporation painful, but in the end also found that the change had made their work more rewarding and fulfilling. The transitional problems at PCB appeared not because of the ESOP itself, but from a change in the culture of the bank. The initial, high turnover of employees came about principally from employees who objected to allocating a larger share of their energies and time to their work.

            Management at PCB realized that for the ESOP to be successful, employees needed to participate to the fullest extent possible in their work.  Education is critical to this participation. By training their employees and sharing more information about the company and the industry, PCB increased participation in three ways:

 

1) Giving more authority to employees over their own jobs (subsidiarity): CEO Emma Lou Brent explains, “Employee-owners were given authority to use their own judgment to do what they felt necessary to retain a customer’s goodwill.  This included the right to negotiate interest rates, refund charges, or use creative options in solving customer problems.”[61]

 

2) Providing more opportunities to participate in group decision-making: Because all employees are now owners, they have a greater stake in all areas of the company, including the board of directors.  At PCB, employees are elected by their peers to be members of the ESOP committee that oversees the communication and implementation of the ESOP.  Committee members attend the national ESOP meeting to educate themselves in the broader ideas and philosophy of ESOPs.

 

3) Better communication throughout the organization: As Brent noted, at PCB more upward communication began to occur. “Sometimes it isn’t what you want to hear, but you’re making progress because now you’re hearing it.  It’s been there all along.  Employees just made sure it didn’t get back to management in the earlier stages.”[62]

 

By increasing accountability and responsibility in the organization, PCB has effectively used their ESOP to set conditions that allow employees to develop in their work.  In other words, by putting the ESOP technique at the service of excellent ends, PCB has given it a “soul,” based on the full participation of their employees.

            The Common Good Challenge: ESOPs, however, are not without their problems.[63]  In some organizations, the sole principle guiding ESOPs is utility; they serve, for example, as a technique for increasing productivity by motivating employees to work harder and more efficiently.  While utility has to be one guiding factor, not only of ESOPs but also of any organizational program, we should remember that utility itself is only an estimate of the efficacy of certain means; ultimately, utility must be measured against an organization’s highest or “final” ends.  For example, one CEO we interviewed argued that he instituted an ESOP strictly for the strategic purpose of stable employment; his end, that is, was to reduce turnover through an ESOP that would make it more difficult for employees to leave the company.  Any other reasons, he thought, were not “good” business thinking, as if to assume that “good” business reasoning must be instrumental reasoning.

            When ESOPs are used in organizations simply as a productivity technique or a tax shelter, the full moral vision of an organization is truncated by what we called in Chapter 2 instrumentalism, whereby employees are seen primarily as means and not first as ends.  To see ESOPs only in terms of productivity tricks or tax advantages misses the larger end of establishing an ownership culture that both distributes wealth justly and develops the person.  ESOPs can create conditions for human development only if the common good in its fullest sense animates the whole business.

            While we have found PCB to be a successful ESOP both morally and economically, the company, like all companies, faces continual challenges in maintaining a principled approach with its ESOP.  In Chapter 2, we criticized the shareholder model for instrumentalizing the purpose and mission of business to the maximization of shareholder wealth.  Employees, as owners, are not beyond the pale of the shareholder model.   They can adopt a financial philosophy of maximizing their own shareholder wealth, causing what could be called the “financialization of ESOPs,” leading to among other things overworked owners.

            One issue causes us to raise some questions for PCB as it relates to instrumentalism.  Here our analysis is more hypothetical than factual; however, our hypothesis serves to bring out how an ESOP, if it is not grounded in a social understanding of property, can decline into one more expression of economism.

            Management at PCB felt that if the bank could increase the ESOP contribution from $100,000 to $250,000 in one year, they could emphasize the importance of ownership in the bank through larger contributions to employees.  In order to do this, the company would have to increase its revenue. Management’s target was to increase its loan portfolio by moving funds “from the lower yielding investment portfolio to higher yielding loans.”[64]  By encouraging customers to take out higher yielding loans, employee payouts improved dramatically.  By linking employee equity with employee activity, PCB was able to meet its strategic goals.

            Certainly, there is nothing wrong with strategically targeting financial goals and achieving them. There are, nonetheless, other important questions to raise, lest financial goals become “teleopathic.” Are customers any better off from the higher yielding loans?  They may be.  Yet, one can easily see a possible conflict between the credit needs of the customer--particularly in a rural, typically lower-income area, such as Rolla, Missouri (where PCB does business)--and the higher yielding loans which simultaneously served management’s strategic goals and employees’ personal interests.  For example, pushing consumption loans through credit cards over production loans with lower interest rates might well serve the financial interests of employees, but might not serve the good of the community of Rolla in general and of PCB’s customers in particular.  The point here is that even employee-owners are subject to the “maximizing,” strategic mentality that pursues the firm’s interest at the expense of the customer, the community and the common good.  This same maximizing mentality can lead to overworked employees, which at the beginning of PCB’s ownership venture, was one of the reasons why some employees left. While ESOPs are a powerful—and to that extent, a “good”-- technique, they do not guarantee that employees will order their particular goods toward the common good. 

            There is, however, a caveat to be noted here.  Unlike an investment financier, the PCB employee sees the customer regularly and is confronted with a face, a family, a fellow-parishioner—a real person.  The PCB employee’s stake in the ESOP is what Gates calls “connected capital,” and relations with PCB’s customers generally involve Gates’ “up-close capitalism.”[65]   It is easier, for example, to say, “I’ll maximize my wealth, and let the customer look to himself,” when the customer is faceless and the community a set of demographic profiles.  The proposition is rather different when one shares with the customer the ordinary relations of community, besides and before a business relationship.  Gates’  “connected, up-close capitalism” may not be virtue, but it is certainly an occasion for virtue.

 

                                                                   Conclusion

            This chapter rests on the belief that a wider ownership of productive property promotes employees’ development and ultimately serves the common good.  We see ESOPs as a particularly effective way of converting corporate workplaces into work communities open to the deliberate promotion of common goods.  ESOPs are capable of being conducted in such a way that employees and managers become conscious participants in a reordering of productive property towards the development of the members of the firm and the strengthening of the wider community.

            Employee ownership supplies an indispensable condition for employee-management solidarity, namely: shares in an undivided good.  It guarantees that management and employees alike can cultivate their individual interests only by building up the organization as a whole.  As Charles Avila reminds us: “[W]ithout something materially concrete to share, we could no longer speak of a koinonia [community], a sharing in common.”[66]   However, even given something materially concrete to share, cooperators in a business organization will fall short of community unless they also share some ends of action that cannot be reduced to a dividend, converted to a price, or otherwise realized singly.  That is to say, ownership in the sense of commanding a share must be completed by ownership in the sense of taking responsibility both for cultivating the good that the firm is, and for pursuing the good that the firm is capable of doing.[67] 

            Worker ownership is consistent within the Christian social tradition in general, and is advocated in the Catholic social tradition in particular, because it tends to serve the end of property by not only distributing wealth in service to human needs, but also by fostering a real community of work.  Put another way, the very difficulties involved in making the transition to a organizational culture of ownership are occasions for training in the habits of solidarity, that is, of considering one’s own good, and of deliberating and acting, in the light of the common good.

            While ESOPs as a means will not magically transform organizations into the very incarnation of the common good, they can certainly move them in the direction of greater community.  Employee ownership provides a condition for employee/management solidarity in creating a community of work. Any such community must rest on a sound economic basis, which makes competencies in finance, marketing, operations, and so forth, essential preconditions. ESOPs provide wider ownership of productive property in a workable fashion, correcting a market economy’s inherent tendency to concentrate ownership.  However, ESOPs are doubly attractive in terms of moving us closer to the common good because they tend to make responsible participation in the ends of enterprise the “flip side” of distributive ownership.[68]

            The circumstances in which ESOPs can be implemented will be contingent on a variety of factors.   The implementation of an ESOP is rife with details, each of which is a potential source of friction: the current culture of the company, access to credit, future cash earnings, board representation, diversification of risk for employee retirement, assessment at sale, and so forth.  These details and the specific circumstances in which they arise call for practically wise managers and employees, who can evaluate the situation as it is, and avoid plunging ahead with a “cookie cutter” approach.   This, of course, is no easy task, but the Christian vocation was never said to be easy.

 

 

Study Questions:

 

1)      Describe the fundamental differences between Kelso and Kohlberg on property. How do their understandings of property shape their use of leveraged techniques?

 

2)      Summarize the Christian view of property. Does this Christian view of property match your view of property? Where are the points of convergence? Where are the points of tension?

 

3)      How does PCB manifest a Christian understanding of ownership? Where do they possibly fall short?

 

 

Video Suggestions:

 

The ESOP Advantage see http://www.esopassociation.org/prodcat/audiovis.html

The Anatomy of a Corporate Takeover (PBS )

The Mondragon Experiment (BBC Documentary “The Third Way.”)


                                                        Chapter 6 Endnotes



[1] We are indebted to many people for the content of this chapter, in particular, Norman Kurland of the Center for Economic and Social Justice in Washington, D.C., and Jeff Gates, whose book The Ownership Solution: Toward a Shared Capitalism for the 21st Century (Reading Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1998) served us as an essential resource on the importance of capital ownership.  The Ownership Solution (as policy-makers from Bill Bradley to Jack Kemp  and analysts from Michael Novak to Mikhail Gorbachev have testified) is “must” reading.  Kurland and Gates are on the front lines of the movement to “repeopleize” corporate property for the 21st century.  Without the aid of their insights and experience, this chapter would not have been much poorer.

 

[2] Peter S. Grosscup, “How to Save the Corporation” in Curing World Poverty, ed. John H. Miller, C.S.C. (St. Louis: Social Justice Review, 1994), 43.

[3] Human Development Report 1998 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 30; see also Gates, The Ownership Solution, 7.  Xabier Gorostiaga discerns the emergence of a “Champagne Glass Civilization,” “… in which flexible capital--a product of the revolution in management and electronics--allows power to be centralized and concentrated as never before in history. Five hundred years ago, the metropolises and empires, which were founded on the basis of colonial exploitation, never achieved this level of concentration and centralization of power. Nor did they achieve the abysmal differences between the standards of living of the metropolis and the colonies, as exists today between a small group of privileged countries in the North and the great majority of nations of the South” (“The Universities of Christian Inspiration and the Catholic Social Thought Confronting the New Millenium” a paper delivered at the Second International Symposium of Catholic Social Thought and Management Education,  Antwerp, Belgium, July 1997. Papers from the conference can be found at www.stthomas.edu/cathstudies/mgmt/antwerp.).

 

[4] See Gates, The Ownership Solution, 3-5, and “Capitalism and Human Dignity: The Ownership Imperative,” America (October 19, 1996): 17.  It is important to note, however, that since 1993 there has been a reversal in income growth patterns: “From the early 1970s through 1993, the trend of increasing income inequality was clear and pervasive. Since 1993, however, this seemingly relentless trend has apparently stalled” (Janet L. Yellen, “Trends in Income Inequality” in The Inequality Paradox: Growth of Income Disparity, eds. James A. Auerbach and Richard S. Belous, [Washington, D.C.: National Policy Association, 1998], 12).  In the same collection of readings, Robert Reich argues that this “reversal” appears in part because more people are employed working longer hours and because retirees are better off (“The Inequality Paradox,” 1).   See also Richard B. Freeman , ed., Working Under Different Rules (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1994);  Michael Hout, “Inequality by Design: Myths, Data, and Politics” at www.epn.org/sage/hout.html;  John H. Hinderaker and Scott W. Johnson, “The Truth About Income Inequality,” a policy paper for the Center of the American Experiment (612-338-3605);  Karen Pennar, “A Helping Hand, Not Just an Invisible Hand,”  Business Week,  24 March 1997, 70-72;  Joseph Spiers, “Why the Income Gap Won’t go Away,”  Fortune,  11 December 1995, vol.132  n.12, 65;   Aaron Bernstein,  “Inequality, How the Gap Between Rich and Poor Huts the Economy,”  Business Week,  15 August 1994, 78-83;  “Slicing the Cake,”  The Economist, 5 November 1994,  13-14;  “Inequality; For Richer, for Poorer,”  The Economist,  5 November 1994, 19-21;  “Rich Man, Poor Man,” The Economist,  24 July 1993, 71;  Robert B. Reich, “As the World Turns,”  The New Republic, 1 May 1989, 23-28;  Dean Baker, “The U.S. Wage Gap and the Decline of Manufacturing,” www. Uswa.org/heartland/2manuf.htm;  J. Stacy Adams, “Toward an Understanding of Inequity,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67 (1963): 422-436;  Gary Burtless, “Worsening American Income Inequality,” The Brookings Review (Spring 1996): 26-31;  “Income Disparity,” Credit Union Magazine (April 1997): 38-42;  Aaron Bernstein, “Sharing Prosperity,” Business Week, 1 September 1997, 64-70.

 

[5] “Politics into economics won’t go,” The Economist (May 11, 1996): 26, cited in Gates, The Ownership Solution, 5. Richard B. Freeman reports that “Virtually all of the past decade’s economic growth has gone to the upper 5 percent of families. Since the early 1970s, while the income of the top 1 percent of households has doubled, family and household incomes have stagnated or declined for 80 percent of the population” (Richard B. Freeman, “The New Inequality, and What To Do About It” at www-polisci.mit.edu/bostonreview-/BR21.6/Freeman.html.  This web site hosts a vibrant discussion on income disparity.)

[6] James M. Poterba and Andrew A. Samwick, Stock Ownership Patterns, Stock Market Fluctuations and Consumption, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995), 295-357, 368-372, cited in Gates, The Ownership Solution, 4.   Michael Hout reports that “from March 1973 and March 1994 Current Population Surveys show a drop in pension coverage from 62 percent to 46 percent of U.S. employees”  (“Inequality by Design: Myths, Data, and Politics” at www.epn.org/sage/hout.html).

 

[7] See Gates, The Ownership Solution, 6.

 

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid., 5.

[10] See Michael Hout, “Inequality by Design: Myths, Data, and Politics,” (these numbers come from the Economic Report of the President, 1996). “The gains in productivity fueled executive compensation, the stock market, and corporate profits. But not wages.”  See Corey Rosen, “Legislative Proposals of the Capital Ownership Group” (unpublished: National Center for Employee Ownership, www.nceo.org.), who reports that real wages have dropped 8% since 1973: “In the 1990s, productivity is up 7%, but wages and benefits are only up 1%.”  Richard B. Freeman argues, “That the United States has distributed the gains from economic growth more unevenly than any other advanced country should make every American uneasy about the nation’s economic performance” ( “The Facts About Rising Economic Disparity” in The Inequality Paradox: Growth of Income Disparity eds. Auerbach and Belous, 20).

[11] The following statistics are taken from Jeff Gates, "From Containment to Community" to appear in a future issue of Perspectives by World Business Academy.  See Gates’ web site www.sharedcapitalism.org

 

[12] Gates, The Ownership Solution, 3.  “Disconnection” is a major theme for Gates, and bears a relation to our idea of the “divided” life.

[13] Peter Drucker, “Peter Drucker Takes the Long View” (an interview), Fortune (28 September 1998): 169.

 

[14] Gates, The Ownership Solution, 8.   Richard B. Freeman explains that “If labor’s capital [pensions and ESOPs] were more firmly under the control of its worker owners, we would expect it would be used to help foreclose the ‘low road’ on industrial restructuring that has disrupted American labor markets and depressed family incomes; to reduce domestic investment’s sensitivity to speculative international capital flows; and to increase the willingness of management to undertake policies that benefit a wider range of enterprise stakeholders than short-term owners of shares” (“The New Inequality, and What to Do About It”).

[15] John A. Ryan, A Better Economic Order (New York and London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1935), 171. He saw three major evils of US capitalism at the time: 1) sub-living wages; 2) excessive wealth disparity between rich and poor and 3) concentration of capital ownership. It was this third evil that Ryan saw as particularly problematic: “the narrow distribution of capital ownership is more fundamental than the other two evils because it threatens the stability of the whole system” (Marvin L. Krier Mich, Catholic Social Teaching and Movements (Mystic: Twenty-Third Publications, 1998), 53).    Kelso’s two source theory emphasizes the fact that those who are dependent for income on their labor alone are ipso facto economically vulnerable (Louis O. Kelso and Mortimer J. Adler, The Capitalist Manifesto [New York: Random House, 1958], Chapter 2).  For example, according to figures released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the first half of 1994, the average hourly earnings for private workers, adjusted for inflation, declined from $8.03 in 1970 to $7.40 in 1994.  In 1995 corporate profits increased 22% due in part to a meager 2.9% increase in benefits and wages. “`What’s going on is a straight redistribution of income from labor to capital,’ says James Annable, economist at First National Bank of Chicago” (Bill Montague, “Wages rose 2.9%; lowest in 15 years,” USA Today [14 February 1996]:1; see also “For richer, for poorer,” The Economist [5 November 1994]: 20).

 

[16] For Kohlberg, the object of a leveraged buyout is to use a little equity and a lot of debt to buy companies. With this, one can run the company more efficiently than before, sell off parts of the company and use the excess cash to pay off debt as soon as possible.  When reselling the streamlined company, the highly leveraged aspect of the deal maximizes the profits of investors and executive managers whose compensation is directly tied to the price of stock.  Since the investor and manager in the LBO had put up so little of their own money to buy the company, the return on investment is maximized in light of the relatively short period during which the company is held (see www.iagi.net/~tt/lbo/concept.html).  It should be noted of course that KKR receives a portion of its leveraged buyout fund from pension funds.  As William Greider put it, “The time has come, perhaps, to ask the question modern liberalism has always ducked: Who owns America?”

 

[17] Kohlberg himself had difficulties with his partners on the direction of KKR: see Sarah Bartlett “The Inside Story of the Rise of KKR,” Fortune (3 June 1991): 172. 

[18] Kohlberg is rather agnostic on the issues of wealth distribution and income disparity.  His concern with financing corporations deals only with the control of property, not with any social vision of distribution.  It matters little who owns the corporation so long as whoever owns also controls.  Actually, in Kohlberg’s vision of the corporation, an advantage can be gained by having only a few people own a company, since this guarantees greater participation on the board of directors and control over executive management.

 

[19] Paul H. Dembinski, “The Financialisation of the World and the Risks of Not Making Sense,” Living in the Global Society, eds. Roberto Papini, Antonio Pavan, Stefano Zamagni (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1997), 156.  As increasing amounts of property take the financial form of shares, financialization conditions us to see property in general, and corporations in particular, as mere opportunities for individual gain.

 

[20] Charles Avila, Ownership: Early Christian Teaching, (Maryknoll: Orbis Books), 3.  He continues, “ownership is a relation, but not so much a relation between a person and the thing owned as between the owning person and other people, whom the owner excludes from, or to whom the owner concedes, possession.”

                [21] ESOPs are defined as qualified retirement plans.  A trust is established, to which a company contributes either by direct payment or through a profit sharing plan or by borrowing money.  The trust is converted into stock by purchase from current shareholders.  That stock is, in turn, held under the names of the individual employees.  When employees retire, they usually sell their stock back to the ESOP, from  which new employees can then purchase it.  Approximately 15,000 U.S. firms have broad employee ownership, with 10,000 of them organized through ESOPs. “Companies with broad-based stock option plans, ESOPs, or other employee ownership arrangements accounted for 47 of the ‘Best 100 Companies in America to Work For.” (“Employee Ownership Companies Top “Best 100 List,” Employee Ownership Report XIX [March/April 1999]: 1).

[22] For Kelso (writing, again, in the 1960s and 1970s) the economy is undergoing an historic shift from a predominantly labor economy to a labor-capital economy.  Thus, to rely solely or principally on wages for wealth distribution is like relying solely on two cyclinders of a four-cyclinder engine: you get half the power, and the system is driven to breakdown.  See also Oswald von Nell-Breuning S.J., “The Formation of Private Property in the Hands of Workers,” in The Social Market Economy: Theory and Ethics of the Economic Order, ed., Peter Koslowski (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1998), 295;  see also Antoine de Salins and François Villeroy de Galhau, The Modern Development of Financial Activities in the Light of the Ethical Demands of Christianity (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1994), 35.

[23] Peter Davis explains that many of the original co-operative enterprises were alarmed by the increasing concentration of ownership of the means of production and by the negative effects that concentration had on the working masses (“Co-operative Management and Co-operative Purpose: Values, Principles and Objectives for Co-operatives into the 21st Century” [unpublished, January 1995]: 7).  In Europe, cooperatives, and in particular the Mondragon cooperatives in Spain, were inspired by a social vision of corporate purpose: see William Foote Whyte and Kathleen King Whyte (Making Mondragon [New York: ILR Press, 1988]), who make the important point that the choice “between considering the pursuit of profits as the sole or primary driving force or considering profits as a necessary limiting condition--a means to other ends” differentiates a shareholder-driven organization from a worker-owner organization. See also Greg MacLeod From Mondragon to America (Sydney: Univeristy of College of Cape Breton Press, 1997). See Mondragon’s web site www.mondragon.mcc.es.

[24] David Kirkpatrick, “Avis: How the Workers Run Avis Better, Fortune (5 December 1988); reprinted in Curing World Poverty, ed. John H. Miller, C.S.C. (St. Louis: Social Justice Review, 1994), 221 (emphasis added).  Kohlberg and Roberts were asked to respond to Kelso’s accusations, but offered no comment.

[25] Frederick Ungeheuer, “They Own the Place,” Time Magazine (6 February 1989): 51. 

[26] See Lewis Hyde, The Gift (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), 3-4.

 

[27] As Augustine explains, “all privation is a diminution” (Avila, Ownership: Early Christian Teaching, 117 see Augustine De Genesi, 11, 15, PL 34:436). Private property has a legal meaning, but theologically, there is no such thing as private property, private sector, private lives, private choices, private spirituality, or private affairs.  Privacy is an illusion, since everything we have an are is formed in the context of our social relationships and has meaning in that context.  The word “private” brings us to the theological and philosophical fault line between an individualistic (Kohlberg) and a Christian (Kelso) view of property/ownership.

 

[28] We are indebted to our colleague Jeanne Buckeye for this story.

 

[29] T.S. Eliot, “Choruses from ‘The Rock’,”  The Complete Poems and Plays, 1909-1950 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1971), 103:

 

When the Stranger says: “What is the meaning of this city?

Do you huddle close together because you love each other?”

What will you answer? “We all dwell together

To make money from each other?” or “This is a community?”

And the Stranger will depart and return to the desert.

O my soul, be prepared for the coming of the Stranger,

Be prepared for him who knows how ask questions.

 

 Within the Christian as well as in most religious traditions,  “A man who owns a thing is naturally expected to share it, to distribute it, to be its trustee and dispenser.” (Hyde, The Gift, 15, see also 138-9).

 

[30]Quoted in  Avila, Ownership: Early Christian Teaching,  67.  See also Luke Timothy Johnson “Wealth and Property in the New Testament” Priests and People (May 1998): 181-184.

[31]That is, the Christian concept of property-ownership is intrinsically linked to stewardship: see Avila, Ownership: Early Christian Teaching, 116.

[32] J. Irwin Miller provides an example of this absolute understanding of private property:In Victorian England the prevailing sentiment was for the sanctity of property rights.  When, therefore, in 1846 at the height of the potato famine, Mrs. Gerrard in County Galway, Ireland, evicted on one day all 300 of her tenants, none of whom was in arrears, so that her holdings might be turned into a grazing farm, Lord Brougham, speaking, in the House of Lords, felt she was acting most ethically indeed.  Said he, ‘Property would be valueless and capital would no longer be invested in cultivation of land if it was not acknowledged that it was the landlord’s undoubted, indefeasible, and most sacred right to deal with his property as he wishes.’  His Lordship asserted this to be a most ethical act, indeed a ‘sacred right,’ because it was in accord with the prevailing tone and sentiment of the ruling class at that time”  (J. Irwin Miller, “How Religious Commitments Shape Corporate Decisions” in On Moral Business: Classical Contemporary Resources for Ethics in Economic Life, eds. Max L. Stackhouse, Dennis P. McCann, and Shirley J. Roels, with Preston N. Williams [Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdman Publishers, 1995], 709). 

 

[33] Aquinas saw individually possessed, productive property as the most expedient means of promoting the common use of created goods; thus, for Aquinas “ownership” means “private possession for the sake of common use.” With this formula, however, Aquinas merely reformulates in a clearer way the major strand of thought on property descending from Christian antiquity, and informed by Jewish teaching.  To regard property as an item of merely private consideration with which one can do entirely as one likes is as antithetical to a Judeo-Christian understanding as seeing the Sabbath as a day on which to do whatever one wants.  As Clement of Alexandria put it, property creates “unrighteous” or wrong relationships “when a man [or organization] for personal [or private] advantage regards it as being entirely his [their] own” (Avila, Ownership: Early Christian Teaching, 44).  The Christian social tradition understands the institution of ownership as a social institution with a social purpose (see  Herbert Vorgrimler and Oswald von Nell-Breuning, “Socio-Economic Life” in Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, vol. 5, ed. Herbert Vorgrimler [New York: Crossroads, 1989], 306; John A. Ryan,  A Living Wage [New York: The Macmillan Company, 1910], 71-72).  Kelso and Adler treat the social dimension of ownership under their participative principle.  In order to establish right relationships in the economy it is imperative to create conditions that allow people to participate in the economy, that is, that allow fair access to productive activities, both through capital (acquired property) and labor (innate “property”).  If this participative principle is to have any meaning, it must be followed by the distributive principle (output), which is defined in relationship to the individual’s labor and capital inputs, so that an economic system is created which links distribution to participation, and incomes to productive contribution (Kelso and Adler  The Capitalist Manifesto, 66-86).

[34] John Paul II, Laborem Exercens, 14.  One of the first calls from the popes on worker ownership came from Pius XI in 1931: “We consider it more advisable in the present condition of human society that, so far as possible, the work-contract be somewhat modified by a partnership-contract . . . Workers and other employees thus become sharers of ownership or management or participate in some fashion in the profits received” (Quadragesimo Anno n. 65; see also Mater Magistra  nn. 77 and  92, and Gaudium et Spes, n. 68).

 

[35] See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., 1947), II II, q. 66, a. 2.

[36] Ibid.

[37] See John Paul II, Laborem Exercens,  n. 15.  The personalist criterion in Catholic social teaching shifts the emphasis in regard to worker ownership from ownership as a means of meeting  physical needs to ownership as a condition of full and responsible participation in economic life.  This is particularly evident in John Paul’s writings concerning worker ownership, although it is also found in John XXIII’s Mater et Magistra.   See also Johannes Messner. Social Ethics (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1949), 822-23;  and, on economic freedom, Hiliare Belloc The Restoration of Property (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1936), 21ff.

 

[38] Dawn Brohawn, “Value-Based Management,” in Curing World Poverty, ed. John H. Miller, C.S.C. (St. Louis: Social Justice Review, 1994),  207.

[39] Pius XII declared, “Wealth is like the blood of the human body, it ought to circulate around all the members of the social body.”  Once blood fails to circulate and is concentrated in one area, the whole body is in danger.

 

[40] Brohawn, “Value-Based Management,” 190.

[41] Luke 11: 17.

 

[42] John Paul, Laborem Exercens, 14.2.

[43] Jack Stack, “Springfield Remanufacturing Corporation” in Curing World Poverty, ed. John H. Miller, C.S.C. (St. Louis: Social Justice Review, 1994), 237.

[44] Jack Stack, The Great Game of Business [Doubleday: New York, 1992] Chapt. 4.

 

[45] Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II II, q. 66, a. 2; see also Leo XIII Rerum Novarum, 36, and Avila, Ownership: Early Christian Teaching, 45.

[46] Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I II q. 19, a. 10.

 

[47] Luke, 12:16-21(RSV).

 

[48] What should become abundantly clear in this discussion is that techniques, such as leverage financing, embodied in different philosophies (Kelso’s communitarianism vs Kohlberg’s individualistic liberalism) lead to radically different outcomes.  Everyone works within a philosophical worldview.  Everyone has first principles or starting points. Reflection on these first principles is of utmost importance both for one’s own moral character as well as to the health and well-being of society.  Financing the capital structure of organizations is embedded within a philosophical view of what a corporation is for. Kelso and Kohlberg represent two competing moral philosophies of property manifested in the modern corporation. One could only imagine what might have  happened if, in the 80s, investors and management had adopted Kelso’s leveraged ESOPs rather than Kohlberg’s leveraged buyouts on behalf of investors dedicated solely to maximizing  return. 

[49] 1 Timothy 6: 10.

 

[50] John Paul II Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, 37. 

[51] Teleopathy is “a habit of character that values limited purposes as supremely action-guiding, to the relative exclusion not only of larger ends, but also moral considerations about means, obligations, and duties.” Goodpaster goes on to explain that “The manifestations of teleopathy are the manifestations of a decision maker that has sacrificed perspective and balance to a goal or a series of goals over time. . . . By turning over balanced judgment to the pursuit of purpose, purpose becomes a kind of idol.  Teleopathy can thus be seen as a secularized form of idolatry (see Kenneth Goodpaster, “Ethical Imperatives and Corporate Leadership” in Ethics in Practice: Managing the Moral Corporation, ed., Kenneth R Andrews [Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1991], 217). See also the entry “Teleopathy” in Blackwell Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Ethics eds. Patricia Werhane and R. Edward Freeman (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 627-628.

[52] Quoted in Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II II, q. 141, a. 6.

[53] See de Salins and Villeroy, The Modern Development of Financial Activities in the Light of the Ethical Demands of Christianity, 27, and  Paul J. Wadell, C.P., The Primacy of Love (New York: Paulist Press, 1992), 135.

[54] Information on this case comes from Emma Lou Brent, “The Evolution of an ESOP Company,” Our Journey to an Ownership Culture, ed. Dawn K. Brohawn  (Washington: The ESOP Association and Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, 1997), 16-27.  For a practical managerial philosophy of ESOPs, see Norman G. Kurland, Dawn K. Brohawn and Michael D. Greaney, “Value-Based Management: A System for Building an Ownership Culture,” available from the Center for Economic and Social Justice (www.cesj.org).  Approximately 12,000 U.S. corporations, covering some 12% of the workforce, have implemented ESOPs, including United Airlines (55% ESOP), Polaroid (25%), and Cargill (17%).

   

 [55] Two ways for an ESOP to be set up are self-finance and leverage: self-financed ESOPs usually draw on a profit-sharing program; in a leveraged ESOP, capital is created with credit, and if competently invested, will pay for itself out of future earnings.

 

[56] The following text comes from  Norm Kurland, The Center for Economic and Social Justice.

 

[57]  Or as Weirton Steel does, the company can create a market for the stock by keeping a minority percentage of shares on the public market. 

 

[58] “When men have become wage-slaves they think in terms of income. When they are economically free they think in terms of property.  Most modern men living under industrial conditions regard economic reform as essentially a redistribution of income; property for them means only an arrangement whereby a certain income is secured.  Free men look at it just the other way.  The think of income as the product of property”  (Belloc, The Restoration of Property,103).

 

[59] Myron S. Scholes and Mark A. Wolfson, “Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Corporate Restructuring: Myths and Realities” Financial Management (Spring 1990): 17.  Nevertheless, the National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO) reports that pay and benefits are higher in ESOP companies than comparable non-ESOP companies (Peter A. Kardas, Adria L. Scharf and Jim Keogh, Wealth and Income Consequences of Employee Ownership [Oakland, California: The National Center for Employee Ownership, 1998], 20ff.).  See also “Pay and Benefits are Higher in ESOP Companies, Employee Ownership Report (July/August 1998): 1, 3.

[60] This distribution of “capital” wealth has multiplying effects for both the organization and the employee.  As Rosen explains, “the more funds that are contributed to an ESOP each year, the more committed the employees are to their company.  They also are more satisfied with their work and more concerned with the company’s financial performance.  And they are much less likely to leave. . . . they would be willing to give up their next wage increase for a share in their companies” (Corey Rosen, “Using ESOPs to Boost Corporate Performance,” Management Review [March 1988]: 30‑33). 

 

[61] Brent, “The Evolution of an ESOP Company,” 25.

 

[62] Ibid., 22.

 

 [63] ESOPs, like all organizational techniques, carry in train difficulties that the prudent manager must examine.  Among the more noteworthy: 1) ESOPs involve a tax subsidy for capitalists (and nascent capitalists) that increases tax rates for others, especially the poor; 2) “ESOPs assume extremely high growth rates that doom the plan on ecological grounds alone.” (Cobb and Daly, On the Common Good [Boston: Beacon Press, 1994], 301); 3) redeeming shares might be costly, depending on the condition of the company (hence, Weirton Steel makes 20% of its shares public, creating a market through which employees can redeem their shares);  4)   ESOPs may encourage employees to entrust too much of their retirement investment in one instrument (see also Ellen E. Schultz, “Workers Put Too Much In Their Employer’s Stock,” The Wall Street Journal [13 September 1996]: A9); 5) valuation, i.e., determining the price of the stock at the time of the sale to employees: employees must be careful of paying too much for a firm, particularly those who are buying a company under economic duress.   

[64] Brent, “The Evolution of an ESOP Company,” 23.

 

[65] See Gates, The Ownership Solution, 50ff.

 

[66] Avila, Ownership: Early Christian Teaching, 44.

 

[67] See Virginia Vanderslice, “Creating Ownership When You Already Have Participation,” Employee Ownership Report, NCEO Newsletter XVIII (November-December, 1998): 5.

 

[68] As Hilaire Belloc pointed out in 1936, if “we regard economic freedom as a good, our object must be thus to restore property.  We must seek political and economic reforms which shall tend to distribute property more and more widely until the owners of sufficient Means of Production . . . are numerous enough to determine the character of society” (Restoration of Property, 21).